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Abstract Recent results from neuroimaging appear to
indicate that some patients in a vegetative state have
partially intact awareness. These results may demon-
strate misdiagnosis and suggest the need not only for
alternative forms of treatment, but also for the
reconsideration of end-of-life decisions in cases of
disorders of consciousness. This article addresses the
second consequence. First, I will discuss which
aspects of consciousness may be involved in neuro-
imaging findings. I will then consider various factors
relevant to ethical end-of-life decision-making, and
analyse whether and to what extent the above
consequence applies to these factors. It will be shown
that knowledge of the existence of partial awareness
in patients with disorders of consciousness only
influences end-of-life decision-making if certain
background assumptions are made.
Keywords Disorders of consciousness . Awareness .
End-of-life decisions . Neuroimaging
Patients in a vegetative state and decisions about life-
sustaining treatment in such cases have often been the
focus of media attention.1 The frequently prolonged
duration of the vegetative state and uncertainty about
the patient’s state of awareness play a key role in
ethical debates. Recent findings in the neurosciences
appear to indicate that patients in a vegetative state
may, contrary to clinical diagnostic criteria, be
conscious, in terms of being aware. To what extent,
however, do such findings influence decisions made
concerning life-sustaining treatment, particularly the
decision on whether or not to withdraw artificial
nutrition and hydration?2 Even if we consider
changing the diagnosis in the case of ‘inconsistent
but clear evidence of consciousness’3 to the minimally
conscious state, the question remains: does knowl-
edge of partial awareness in disorders of conscious-
ness change the normative evaluation of whether or
not to withdraw artificial nutrition and hydration? Or




1 See for example [42] for a discussion of media coverage of
the vegetative state.
2 Withdrawing artificial nutrition and hydration is one of the
most challenging ethical questions in the field of end-of-life
decision-making for disorders of consciousness. See [24].
3 [8], p. 24. Further down I will specify the two diagnoses and
the locked-in syndrome. In this paper I refer to the disorders of
consciousness known as the vegetative state and the minimally
conscious state.
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After briefly describing the neuroscientific findings
regarding the vegetative state, I will first consider the
question which kind of awareness or characteristics of
consciousness are being discussed. I then pose the
principal question of this article—namely, whether
these findings change any aspects of the normative
assessment of end-of-life decisions with regard to
disorders of consciousness. To address this question, I
will discuss various theoretical views that appear to
be critically important in normative end-of-life
decision-making and awareness. I argue that, depend-
ing on the theory, such theoretical bases may have a
greater influence on end-of-life decision-making with
regard to these patients than knowledge of potential
awareness itself.
Regarding end-of-life decisions, particularly for
those decisions concerning whether or not to with-
draw artificial hydration and nutrition, I will analyse
to what extent the knowledge of awareness is critical
for attribution of moral status within a particular
moral theory. I will also clarify the significance of
theoretical assumptions about personal identity for
those decisions in connection with knowledge of
awareness in patients with disorders of consciousness.
The significance of the principle of respect for
autonomy in the context of different states of
awareness in patients with disorders of consciousness
and end-of-life decisions, like whether or not to
withdraw artificial hydration and nutrition, will also
be described.
Disorders of Consciousness and New Findings
on Potential Awareness
Characteristic of the vegetative state and essential for
a clinical diagnosis thereof is the absence of visible
evidence of intact awareness. According to the
neurological definition of the vegetative state, arousal
is still present in these patients, but they show no
signs of awareness of themselves or of the environ-
ment or of purposeful activity.4 A vegetative state is a
post-comatose state that develops after severe brain
damage of varying causes such as hypoxia or
traumatic head injuries. Independent respiratory func-
tion may still be present. Although patients in a
vegetative state exhibit sleep-wake cycles, reflex
behaviour in response to painful stimuli, and involun-
tary motor functions, they do not show voluntary
reactions or other signs of perception or awareness.5
Diagnosis is actually primarily made clinically.
Recent findings using neuroimaging techniques such
as functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI)
suggest, however, that diagnosis using such techni-
ques is essential. Specifically, they may provide
evidence that certain characteristics of awareness
have been retained in the vegetative state. Therefore,
they could help to differentiate between patients in a
vegetative state, in a minimally conscious state and in
a locked-in syndrome and reduce misdiagnosis.6 After
clinical observation, patients are diagnosed as being
in a minimally conscious state rather than a vegetative
state if they show some evidence of awareness (even
if inconsistent and variable, but reproducible and
distinguishable from reflexes), such as following
simple commands. Locked-in syndrome is not a
disorder of consciousness, but a neurological state in
which patients have no motor function but intact
awareness, perception and cognition.7 The recently
postulated assumption that awareness is present in
some cases of vegetative-state patients arises from the
identification of activity patterns in the brain that are
similar to those of healthy people following external
stimulation. Most of the fMRI findings obtained
regarding the state of awareness of these patients do
not actually indicate elevated activity in higher-order
association areas.8
4 See [8], p. 23 f.
5 See [44], [16], p. 57 ff.; and [15], p. 77.
6 Cases of misdiagnosis between the vegetative state and the
minimally conscious state (sometimes even the locked-in
syndrome) are not rare, see [19, 18, 20]. One main difference
between patients in a locked-in syndrome and patients in a
vegetative state or a minimally conscious state is that in some
cases they have the ability to communicate through eye
movement or brain-computer-interfaces. For more on this topic,
see [4].
7 See [8], p. 25 and p. 27. Cortical function in the vegetative
state is usually restricted to cortical islands, which are not
integrated within functional networks, but the functions of the
diencephalon and brainstem remain largely intact. In the
minimally conscious state there seems to be functional
connectivity within the large cortical networks. In the locked-
in syndrome, the global brain metabolism and cortical networks
are usually normal, but there is extensive paralysis due to the
disruption of the pyramidal tract or the motor efferences in the
peripheral nervous system. For further information see [8], p.
23 f.
8 See [16], p. 77; [26, 27].
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However, some studies postulate a significant
increase of activity in areas of the cortex, which
could allow one to infer that partially intact awareness
is present. For example, patients have been asked to
imagine particular activities that were familiar to
them. After this request, some patients show an
increase in the activity of the motor cortex similar to
that observed in healthy individuals.9 Another study
suggests the ability of wilful modulation of brain
activity in disorders of consciousness by answering
yes-or-no questions during neuroimaging.10 There are
also individual studies that postulate that patients in a
vegetative state exhibit a similar emotional response
after being addressed by family members to that
observed in healthy people. Researchers reached this
conclusion after detecting variation in activity around
the amygdala depending on whether the patients were
addressed by family or by strangers or were directly
or indirectly addressed.11 A recent study by Boly et
al. could change the research focus on vegetative state
and awareness again. They postulate an impairment of
backward connectivity from frontal to temporal
cortices in a vegetative state as essential to differen-
tiate these patients from controls with neuroimaging
techniques.12
If patients in a vegetative state are aware of
themselves and their environment to some extent (as
indicated in the mentioned studies), then they would
probably be diagnosed as being in a minimally
conscious state. Therefore, the question of the
influence of knowledge (clinical or through neuro-
imaging) of partial awareness on normative assess-
ment of end-of-life decisions applies as well to the
vegetative state as to the minimally conscious state.
The question of such influence to normative assess-
ment also applies to the locked-in syndrome, but as
we will see later, the normative assessment of end-of-
life decisions is clearly transformed if the patients
become able to sufficiently communicate wishes as is
sometimes possible in the locked-in syndrome (through
eye movements or BCI).
To answer the main question it is helpful to have a
closer look at the following question: which aspects
of awareness could be indicated in patients with
disorders of consciousness based on the findings that
were mentioned? In the theoretical debate concerning
consciousness, different aspects have been emphas-
ised and discussed. For example, when alluding to the
experiential nature of feelings and perceptions there is
talk of phenomenal consciousness. Intentionality can
constitute an additional structural feature of human
consciousness. Intentionality involves a subject refer-
ring to an object or to a situation, more generally:
intentionality is about the directness of mental
states.13 Access consciousness requires that the
subject has access to the representational content of
a mental state. This access may have various
conditions. It may be sufficient if the representational
content of a state initiates or coordinates the course of
action, but it may also be necessary that the subject is
able to report the representational content using
language.14 One speaks of self-consciousness if the
subject not only refers to him- or herself but also
experiences him- or herself as someone who is in a
certain mental state, that is, when he or she is aware
of his or her own state of consciousness.15
The cited findings do not constitute evidence for
self-consciousness, but the missing of evidence does
not necessarily mean that it is impossible that patients
with disorders of consciousness have self-
consciousness. More evidence seems to be given by
the findings for qualitative mental experience or
phenomenal consciousness in disorders of conscious-
ness if patients show increased neuronal activity when
addressed by family members. Likewise, this could
9 See [16], p. 77; [11, 34, 37, 38, 44].
10 See [35]. It has to be said that the results of this study apply
to patients in a vegetative or minimally conscious state. The
problem of making a distinction between a clinically diagnosed
vegetative state and a minimally conscious state remains though
for all cited studies.
11 See [12].
12 See [7]. It should be noted here that in the philosophy of
mind the idea that everything about the quality of mental
experiences can be learned on the basis of neuronal activity is
highly controversial. See the “explanatory gap argument”
posited by [28], and the “knowledge argument” posited by [23].
13 For a short description of the long debate on the relationship
of consciousness and intentionality, see for example [47]. Some
philosophers would argue that consciousness is separate from
intentionality and cannot be derived from it; others consider
consciousness and intentionality as inseparable, see [47].
14 See [39], 77; [49], p. 77 f. The differentiation between access
consciousness and phenomenal consciousness was first made
by Ned Block, see [6]. For a summary of the discussion of
intentionality and the interrelationship between intentionality
and phenomenal consciousness, see [31].
15 See [49], p. 64 f. For more on pre-reflective self-
consciousness, self-reference and self-knowledge in relation to
self-consciousness, see for example [14, 46, 50].
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indicate intentionality, as could detection of increased
activity in higher association areas following
instructions.
Such findings could be highly relevant for the
everyday care of patients with disorders of conscious-
ness. Family members may for example feel more
compelled to directly address patients, if signs of
awareness could be demonstrated through neuroimag-
ing in patients where clinical signs are absent. Those
findings could also help reduce the amount of
misdiagnoses.
But what do these findings mean for moral judge-
ments in end-of-life decisions involving patients with
disorders of consciousness?
Aspects of Normative End-of-Life Decision-Making
Involving Patients with Disorders of Consciousness
Before I examine this question on the basis of an
evaluation of autonomy, I will briefly describe how
the principle of respect for autonomy is usually
incorporated into decision-making processes in med-
ical ethics. Ethical obligations towards patients and
third parties in medical ethics are usually evaluated
using the moral approach of principlism. Four ‘mid-
level’ principles—respect for autonomy, beneficence,
non-maleficence and justice—come into play in the
assessment process. These principles are balanced
against one another in a given case.16 Ethical
coherence forms a theoretical foundation for such an
assessment process.17 In practical decision situations
it is always critical to know whether the principles
used in the assessment derive their meaning from
common sense or whether it is sought to justify the
individual principles. At least in my opinion, despite
the fitness of the practical application of these
principles, the theoretical foundations on which the
individual principles are based in the case of a
particular ‘user’ should always remain apparent. It is
not possible to elaborate all four principles in detail
here in reference to disorders of consciousness. I will
also refrain from undertaking a balancing of these
principles for disorders of consciousness in the end.18
Instead, I will consider some fundamental aspects of
these principles in light of their theoretical founda-
tions and in reference to disorders of consciousness.
In a discussion of moral status, various options for
establishing a theoretical foundation for the principles
of beneficence and non-maleficence become apparent.
In the process of reflection on the four mid-level
principles, we are led again to classical moral
philosophical approaches, approaches which may
serve as a basis for these principles in the present
case, i.e. the rendering of normative assessments in
end-of-life decisions for disorders of consciousness.
First, I will seek to contribute to reflections on the
principle of respect for patient autonomy. In doing so,
I hope to clarify which fundamental background
assumptions characterise this principle and how this
in turn influences the end-of-life decision-situation
with regard to patients with disorders of conscious-
ness. Picking this principle first is justified by its
importance for end-of-life decisions. The principle of
respect for autonomy is represented in a living will
and in substituted judgements. Particularly in these
cases, this principle is dependent on the assumed
theory of personal identity.
Autonomy and Personal Identity
In medical debates, autonomy is usually defined as
both a negative and a positive freedom, that is, the
absence of external compulsions and autonomy as the
possession of actual capacities. The term ‘autonomy’
is derived from the Greek autos (‘self’) and nomos
(‘law’, ‘determination’). Even at the terminological
level, there are two primary features apparent when
referring to autonomy: self-determination and self-
legislation. In ancient times, self-legislation had
strong connections to politics while the reference to
individual autonomy only developed much later in
philosophy. The opportunity and ability to mould
one’s own life according to one’s own plans con-
stitutes another essential feature of autonomy.19 The
latter also produces certain regularities and makes
people predictable. These different aspects of auton-
omy are associated with different conditions neces-
sary to satisfy autonomy.
Demands for autonomy in medical ethics are
usually associated with the commonly understood
16 For a detailed description of this approach, see [3]. For a
critical discussion of principlism, see e.g. [17].
17 On the subject of ethical coherence, see e.g. [10, 51].
18 See [24] for an attempt to balance the cited four principles
for the vegetative state. 19 See [3], p. 99 f.; [22], p. 53; [2], p. 9.
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definition of autonomy as self-determination and
require some standards of competence. The person
must be able to understand information and his or her
own situation and any consequences resulting from
the situation to a substantial degree, to adequately
process information, to be able to specify reasons, to
be able to communicate preferences, to be able to
justify preferences and actions and so on. The person
must also be able to act intentionally, employ
appropriate means for goals he or she has set, that
is, to be able to display a certain instrumental
rationality as well as be able to implement his or her
goals. There should be no further influences that
control or determine a person’s actions.20
We can also speak of self-determination when a
person is able to mould his or her life in accordance
with his or her own ‘higher-order’ desires. This
means that he or she does not pursue every arbitrary
desire ad hoc, but rather follows desires that he or she
perceives as being of higher value. This goes beyond
means-end reasoning and its implementation, as well
as the conditions that are imposed with such an
understanding of autonomy. Within this meaning of
self-determination, both a certain biographical identity
is required as well as a reflexive identification with a
person’s own desires. Through the continual imple-
mentation of this human ability, the actions of humans
also become more predictable for others. This, in turn,
is an essential condition of being able to make a
substituted judgement for humans in cases such as
disorders of consciousness.21
The question here is: can patients with a disorder
of consciousness satisfy any one of the conditions of
autonomy, with or without certain characteristics of
awareness? The practical verifiability of autonomy is
inherently afflicted with a range of problems.22 How-
ever, for patients with a disorder of consciousness, it
is unlikely that even minimal conditions of self-
determination can be met, neither using clinical
observation nor applying the findings from
neuroimaging about potentially present awareness.
This assessment would change rapidly if neuroscien-
tific techniques could help patients to communicate
their actual will, as in cases of patients with locked-in
syndrome. Probably the diagnosis of disorder of
consciousness would change then as well. The
question of whether the findings from neuroimaging
change something in the prospective autonomy of the
patients or in a substituted judgement process appears,
therefore, to be far more relevant for patients with
disorders of consciousness.
Recognising prospective autonomy in the context
of a living will or establishing a substituted judgement
is always necessary when a patient is no longer able
to declare his or her current wishes.23 Does something
change in the assessment of the validity of patients’
living wills or of the substituted judgements as a
result of the information about potential awareness in
disorders of consciousness, which were clinically
unrecognised before?
If a living will is not available, then the will of the
patient is determined by family members or doctors as a
substituted judgement. The life concepts and personal
wishes of the patient prior to the development of his or
her illness are referred to in this case. On the one hand—
as we will subsequently see more clearly—our concep-
tion of personal identity is decisive here. Can one
presume a diachronic identity for the person even
without consciousness or only with evidence of a state
of consciousness? If one considers personal identity as
existing only when certain states of consciousness are
present, then establishing a substituted judgement on
this basis could make sense. Just as relevant for a
substituted judgement is an assessment of how the
patient would have judged a state of being able to
perceive and be aware while at the same time being
unable to act compared to a state of both being unable to
act and being without awareness. Knowledge of the
state of awareness in disorders of consciousness is
absolutely relevant for making a substituted judgement
after such an assessment.
How does the assessment of patients’ living wills
relate to recent knowledge gained about disorders of
consciousness through neuroimaging with regard to
their state of awareness? The answer to this question
depends on various components of the underlying
20 See [3], chapter 4. On the topic of instrumental reasons, see
e.g. [45].
21 For more on reflective identification with wishes and
autonomy, see [41]; for more on the original development of
the theory of second-order volitions, see [13]. Autonomy can be
understood in a Kantian manner as well as self-legislation. It
presupposes self-determination, but demands even more of
moral subjects.
22 For a review of empirical approaches to assess Patients’
Decision Making Competence, see [54].
23 See [32] for a discussion of patients’ living will in the special
case of the vegatative state.
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theoretical assumptions. One such assumption con-
cerns personal identity. Another concerns the under-
standing of autonomy underlying the living will. I
will deal with the latter point first.
If self-determination in the sense of instrumental
rationality or reflexive identification with higher-order
desires is used to justify the validity of a living will,
then the living will is valid in its application despite
the discovery through neuroimaging of a clinically
unrecognised, potential awareness in disorders of
consciousness, unless assumptions of the living will
about consciousness and cases of its disorders are
false. If the validity of a living will is justified in the
way mentioned above, then its validity could only be
rendered by false assumptions in the living will or by
a current autonomous decision. Neither knowledge of
awareness gained from clinical observation in the
minimally conscious state nor observation of potential
awareness through neuroimaging changes the assess-
ment of non-existing current autonomy in disorders of
consciousness as long as there is no possibility of
sufficient communication (e. g. with brain-computer-
interfaces in a locked-in syndrome).
It is also possible, but very rare in medical ethics,
to define autonomy with very strict provisos in a
Kantian way. This could, according to some inter-
preters, even make it impossible to sign a living will,
which contains the action maxim to die in cases of
disorders of consciousness, independently of the state
of awareness. To determine the correctness of such an
interpretation is not the subject of this article.
However, it should be noted that the assessment of
whether a particular living will must be followed is
more dependent on the fundamental understanding of
autonomy than on knowledge of potential awareness
in disorders of consciousness.
With the standard understanding of autonomy
meaning self-determination, the turning point for the
assessment of a living will in cases of disorders of
consciousness seems to rely more on the ability of
sufficient communication, which is not verifiable in
disorders other than the locked-in-syndrome, rather
than signs of awareness through neuroimaging tech-
niques. Such signs, however, could be the beginning
of a process ending in facilitating possibilities to
communicate sufficiently in cases of misdiagnosed
patients, who are in a locked-in state.
The other component of the question whether
living wills are valid despite or precisely because of
knowledge of potential awareness in disorders of
consciousness is the theoretical background of per-
sonal identity used in each case. Because this subject
is somewhat more complex, I will briefly summarise
the various positions to clarify the essential criteria for
determining personal identity.
In the debate on personal identity it is—roughly
speaking—usually a question of determining when
and how we can know that a person at time points t1
and t2 is identical. Locke made a significant contri-
bution to such deliberations by postulating both a
memory criterion (which he called consciousness) as
well as by arguing that personal identity must be a
question not of a substance, but rather of a relation.24
This criterion has received much criticism, and today
many theoreticians consider a continuity of psycho-
logical states rather than a memory criterion as
essential for personal identity.25 For other philoso-
phers including Williams, the continuity of the body
is a necessary condition for personal identity. Only if
the relation of personal identity is tied to the body can
the essential principle of unambiguousness be satis-
fied for Williams.26 The latter criterion was exten-
sively modified over the course of the debate as well.
There is thus talk of a ‘physical criterion’, according
to which personal identity is present as long as the
brain is sufficiently intact, such that the person is
alive.27 The various criteria have also been combined
with one another in different ways, resulting in an
abundance of multi-criteria approaches.
The question that results from the debate about
personal identity for the article is: how do particular
assumptions about personal identity affect the validity
of living wills in cases of disorders of consciousness
and under consideration of whether knowledge of a
state of awareness is available?
If a physical criterion or a type of body criterion is
necessary and sufficient to determine personal iden-
tity, then the living will must be considered valid both
with and without knowledge of awareness in patients
with disorders of consciousness because it refers to
the same organism.
If, on the other hand, the relation of personal
identity is tied to the continuity of psychological
24 See [29].
25 Criticism can be found in [36], p.10 ff.
26 See [55]. For an introduction to and discussion of various
criteria of personal identity, see [36].
27 See in this regard [36], p. 2 ff.
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states, then the assumption of awareness may be
relevant for the validity of living wills and therefore
for decisions concerning whether or not to withdraw
artificial nutrition and hydration.
Whether this is the case also depends greatly on the
understanding of what the continuity of psychological
states requires: with the ability for verbal communi-
cation, or with inconsistent and variable (but repro-
ducible and distinguishable from reflexes) reactions
and with the assumption of awareness, or with
involuntary movements of patients and observable
opening of the eyes or with vegetative functions. If
for example observations of involuntary movements
in patients in a vegetative state are not sufficient to
attribute a continuity of psychological states and thus
personal identity to patients in a vegetative state, then
the living will would no longer be a case of
prospective autonomy. The previously established
self-determination would then refer to another person
and decisions on whether or not to withdraw artificial
nutrition and hydration would have to be made using
criteria other than the living will.28 If, at the same
time, signs of awareness would be regarded as
sufficient for attributing continuity of psychological
states, then new findings through neuroimaging
would suspend previous conclusions and the living
will would still refer to the same person.
The preceding conclusions may appear drastic—
however, it would be a logical consequence of
applying certain theories of personal identity. Unlike
discussions in philosophy, in debates in medical
ethics the criteria for determining personal identity
usually (even if often only implicitly) also incorporate
the body and physical elements of the person.
Nevertheless, this discussion clarifies that the appli-
cability of living wills in cases of disorders of
consciousness is absolutely dependent on the under-
lying theory of personal identity and that, as a result,
assumptions about the presence of awareness may
make an essential difference to the assessment
depending on the theory.
In this regard, one could further differentiate
between the different characteristics of consciousness
listed earlier and the particular connection with
personal identity. For reasons of space, this possibility
for further differentiation will only be suggested in the
following. Earlier it was presumed that new neuro-
scientific findings about disorders of consciousness
could be indicative of phenomenal consciousness or
intentionality rather than self-consciousness, even if
they do not preclude it. These could only form a basis
for personal identity if continuity of psychological states
is a sufficient condition for personal identity. If, on the
other hand, memory is applied as a necessary condition in
accordance with Locke, then this could hardly be satisfied
without self-consciousness.29 Correspondingly, one
could differentiate even further with regard to the
applicability of the living will.
Moral Status, Beneficence and Non-Maleficence
So far, we have seen that the understanding of both
autonomy and personal identity that is used greatly
influences normative end-of-life decisions with regard
to patients with disorders of consciousness. We have
also seen that depending on the theory applied,
knowledge of awareness in disorders of conscious-
ness has a varying level of relevance for end-of-life
decisions. These results were illustrated using an
analysis of the logical consequences of particular
ways of understanding autonomy and personal iden-
tity in connection with prospective autonomy or
autonomy by proxy.
Alongside these considerations, it is also necessary
for the applicability of living wills that patients with
disorders of consciousness are assigned a moral
status. In the following, it is shown by using examples
of two opposing moral philosophical approaches that
not every theoretical concept requires the moral status
to be dependent on the state of awareness. Correspond-
ingly, normative decisions regarding patients with
disorders of consciousness that use moral status as a
criterion necessarily rely on a moral philosophical
theory, but not necessarily on information regarding
the state of awareness.
Usually entities such as persons are ascribed moral
status if they exhibit properties on the basis of which
they must be morally considered in a specific way (for
example, through rights and obligations).30 The
difficulty in the present matter lies in the fact that
different moral theories deal with the issue of moral
status in greatly differing ways. These differences
28 A discussion of ontological objections to living wills can be
found in [40], p. 190 ff.
29 In this case, memory refers to autobiographical memory.
30 A detailed discussion on moral status is provided by [43, 53].
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result from answers to the following and similar
questions: (1) what properties determine moral status?
(2) Is there a difference between the justification of
the attribution of moral status and the criteria for an
actual attribution? (3) Do certain rights or duties
necessarily arise from particular properties or from
moral status?31
A comprehensive theory of the moral status of
humans cannot be developed within the scope of this
discussion. Yet, the aforementioned questions can
serve as signposts in the discussion. (1) A morally
relevant characteristic may be the ability to suffer, for
example, or the ability to have preferences. A
capacity for reason may also be a morally relevant
characteristic. The latter are critical in providing a
theoretical foundation for human dignity. The list of
morally relevant characteristics is in no way exhausted
with this list; such characteristics were selected as
examples to illustrate the way knowledge regarding
the state of awareness affects the end-of-life decision-
making process differently depending on the philosoph-
ical theory presupposed.
The ability to suffer usually requires phenomenal
consciousness; depending on the theory, access
consciousness may also be required to be able to
ascribe a capacity for suffering. The same also applies
to the capacity to experience pain. A capacity for
experiencing pain or for suffering is usually a morally
relevant characteristic.32 If the capacity for suffering
or perceiving pain is thus the morally relevant
characteristic for ascribing moral status to a patient
with a disorder of consciousness (1), then findings
from neuroscience about possible states of awareness
could indeed provide relevant information.33 The
criteria of actual attribution of this characteristic
would be congruent with the practice of justification
(2).
With regard to the criteria of attribution for patients
with disorders of consciousness, there is, however, an
epistemic problem previously addressed regarding
findings of neuroimaging. If one presumes the
characteristic of being able ‘to experience suffering
or pain’ as being morally relevant, then objections of
epistemic uncertainty should not remain unconsid-
ered. In everyday medical-normative decisions with
regard to patients with disorders of consciousness, the
mere suspicion that capacity for pain and suffering
may still be present appears to override these objections
and to justify, say, pain medication, assuming one seeks
to behave within the meaning of the principles of
beneficence and non-maleficence.34 If, however, it is a
question of end-of-life decisions, then such objections
are too substantial for moral status to be determined in
this manner.
Epistemic uncertainty also cast significant doubt
upon the formulation of conclusions regarding the
current well-being of the patient based on the afore-
mentioned findings, and, by extension, on end-of-life
decision-making processes that relate to current well-
being. Wellbeing, which in accordance with the
principle of beneficence, must be promoted (accord-
ing to underlying utilitarian theories) is associated
with freedom from pain and suffering in both
colloquial usage and commonly in philosophical
(usually utilitarian) contexts. Neither clinical assess-
ment nor the results from neuroimaging concerning
possible awareness in patients with disorders of
consciousness do, however, provide qualitative infor-
mation about current well-being that would be
credible for end-of-life decisions. This conclusion is
not based on the assertion of a fundamental indepen-
dence of well-being from consciousness, but rather
that current wellbeing cannot be recognised based on
the results discussed.
31 See also [43].
32 Some even claim that suffering is possible without phenom-
enal consciousness; see [9]. For a discussion on the difference
between these characteristics of consciousness in general, on
the possibility of their separate manifestation, and with regard
to pain, see [6]. More on the relationship between avoidance of
pain and utilitarianism can be found in [33]. For a discussion of
the ability to suffer as a condition for having interests, see [48].
33 Savulescu and Kahane [44] present various considerations
concerning patients in a vegetative state, in a minimally
conscious state and in a locked-in syndrome in relation to their
state of consciousness, wisdom, experiential interests and the
value of life. They ultimately come to the conclusion that
“enjoyment of consciousness might actually give stronger
moral reasons not to preserve a patient’s life, and, indeed, that
these might be stronger when patients retain significant
cognitive function.” (p.1)
34 The avoidance of pain and suffering can be the subject of the
principle of beneficence, which is concerned with assuring the
well-being or benefit of the patient (see [3], chapter 6), as well
as the subject of the principle of nonmaleficence, according to
which no actions should be taken that harm the patient (see [3],
chapter 5). Signs of pain given by patients with disorders of
consciousness could be a helpful indication for such harmful
actions. To make a sufficient differentiation between benefi-
cence and non-maleficence is not the aim here, more on that see
[3], p. 199.
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The ability to form preferences—another possible
characteristic for justifying and ascribing moral status
(1)—is often connected with the requirement of self-
consciousness.35 This requirement could be consid-
ered as being unsatisfied in patients with disorders of
consciousness, depending of the interpretation of
recent findings. Should this characteristic be relevant
for moral status, then patients with disorders of
consciousness could not be ascribed a certain moral
status (2).
With regard to human dignity, the situation is quite
different. The effort to respect and preserve this
dignity can also be interpreted as a far-reaching
approach based on the principles of beneficence and
non-maleficence. The requirement that humans
should never be treated simply as a means but always
at the same time as an end is premised on the
principle of human dignity.36 In line with Kant’s
reasoning, human dignity must be ascribed to all
beings capable of reason (1). According to this moral
theory, a capacity for reason and autonomy constitute
essential and morally relevant characteristics of
humankind. Human dignity is not only associated
with autonomy here, but is substantiated by it.
Although the definition of autonomy as self-
legislation as guided by Kant presupposes the
preceding prerequisites of self-determination, it
demands more of moral subjects. Moral subjects are
obligated to follow action maxims, which can become
universal law without contradiction. This goes far
beyond what is usually subsumed under autonomy in
medical ethical debates.37 It was already mentioned
earlier that in patients with disorders of conscious-
ness, even weak criteria for self-determination cannot
currently be fulfilled, neither clinically nor regarding
new neuroscientific findings.
Can these patients therefore not be ascribed moral
status on the basis of this moral philosophical theory?
In this regard, we must differentiate between the
criteria to justify moral status and the criteria for an
actual attribution (2). The foregoing discussion relates
to the justification. The criteria of attribution are also
justified with the potential capacity for reason, which
is supposed for all human beings. Therefore corporal
living existence of a human is understood in most
interpretations of Kantian moral philosophy to be an
adequate criterion for attribution. The attribution of
moral status does not require the actual exercise of the
capacity for reason. The extension of the term human
dignity thus also includes cases in which self-
determination and self-legislation cannot be realised.38
The presence of a specific form of awareness is thus
not a necessary condition for ascribing moral status to
these patients.
However, it is still not certain which rights arise (3)
out of this moral status (this is also the case with other
justification processes). Although a right to life is
usually linked to human dignity, this does not
necessarily have to be the case. A duty to life is not
usually assumed in most debates about human
dignity.39 The connection between right to life / duty
to live and moral status is thus again dependent on
theory.
Conclusion
Theoretical dependence could thus be consistently
demonstrated for the criteria examined here that are
relevant for end-of-life decisions involving patients with
disorders of consciousness. By contrast, the decision
was not established as a result of knowledge of potential
awareness for all criteria; rather, the underlying theory
was critical for the decision process.
Knowledge of potential awareness beyond clinical
assessment in patients with disorders of consciousness
and research into this subject can be extremely helpful
when there is a need to establish or even justify
particular treatment options. Thus, music therapy for
example could be justified by the assumption that
these patients possess phenomenal consciousness.
35 See [21]. For more on preferences and utilitarian theory see
[48] and on consequentialism, see [5].
36 This conception of human dignity enunciated in numerous
instances by Kant can be found in [25] VI, p. 462; [25] IV, p.
438, etc.
37 For more on Kant and autonomy see [1]. Vossenkuhl [52]
discusses the possibility of a narrow and broad understanding
of autonomy in connection with the principle of respect for
autonomy in decision-making processes in medical contexts.
He also asserts that the protection of human dignity is
immanent in the principle of non-maleficence.
38 See [30], p. 48.
39 In contrast to dignity, the right to life is not an ‘inalienable
right’ (see suicide); furthermore, in contrast to dignity, it can be
balanced (e. g. with autonomy), see [40], p. 48 f. Kant’s
concept of dignity can be interpreted such that a right to life and
duty are both implied; on the subject of the perfect duty and
self-preservation, see [25] VI, p. 421.
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Similarly, knowledge of possible awareness can
influence the contact behaviour of family members.
Results of neuroimaging could also help to diminish
misdiagnosis, to identify patients in a minimally
conscious state or in a locked-in syndrome more
precisely and to allow more appropriate prognosis.
If and when, however, the criteria analysed here are
used for normative decisions about life-sustaining
treatment, then actual available knowledge of a more
or less intact awareness in patients with disorders of
consciousness only results in a change in the decision
situation on whether or not to withdraw artificial
nutrition and hydration for example under the applica-
tion of certain background theoretical assumptions.
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